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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant-Appellant will be called "Griffith". Plaintiff-
Respondent will be called "Dresser". Commercial Security Bank 
will be called "CSB." 
ISSUES 
1. Whether funds belonging to a corporation but held in a 
bank account listed under the name of an individual may be 
garnished by a judgment creditor of the individual. 
2. Whether the funds garnished by Dresser belonged to Modern 
Equipment Company, a corporation, or Griffith, Dresser's judgment 
debtor. 
3. Whether CSB should be estopped to assert in its answers 
to Dresser's garnishee interrogatories that the funds in the 
Modern Equipment's account belonged to Griffith. 
4. Whether Dresser should be estopped to invoke garnishment 
remedies because of improprieties in its efforts to collect its 
judgment against Griffith. 
5. If the garnished funds are found to be personal, whether 
Dresser's entitlement thereto is subject to Rule 64D's limitation 
on garnishment of earnings from personal service. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action concerns the propriety of Dresser's garnishment 
of funds which Griffith contends belong to a nonjudgment debtor 
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corporate on. 
On September 2, 1986, Dresser garnished a CSB checking 
account in an effort to satisfy a judgment it had obtained on 
July 23, 1986 against Griffith. Griffith, contending that the 
funds in the account belonged to a business which had been 
incorporated on July 11, 1986, objected to the garnishment and 
moved the district court to set it aside. The District Court 
held a brief evidentiary hearing, took the matter under 
advisement and later denied Griffith's motion to set aside the 
garnishment and garnishee judgment. 
RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
The following portions of Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are relevant to issues raised in this appeal: 
(d) Issuance of Writ. 
* * * * * * * * * 
(ii) After the entry of a judgment requiring the payment of 
money, the clerk of any court from which execution thereon may be 
issued shall issue a writ or writs of garnishment, without the 
necessity for an undertaking, upon the filing of an affidavit of 
the judgment creditor: (a) identifying the person sought to be 
charged as a garnishee: (b) stating that the personal property 
sought to be garnished is non-exempt; and (c) stating whether 
such property consists in whole or part of earnings from personal 
services as hereinafter defined in (e) (iv) of this Rule. 
Several writs may be issued at the same time and the names of as 
many persons as are sought to be charged as garnishees may be 
inserted in the same writ or different writs. 
(e) Content and Effect of Writ - To Whom Directed. 
(i) The writ of garnishment shall be issued in the name of 
the state of Utah and shall be directed to the person or persons 
designated in the plaintiff's affidavit as garnishee or 
garnishees, advising each such person that he is attached as 
garnishee in the action, and commanding him not to pay any debt 
due or to become due to the defendant which is not exempt from 
execution and to retain possession and control of all credits, 
chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action, money and 
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persona] property and rights to property of such defendant not 
exempt from execution until further order of the court. 
(ii) The writ may further require the garnishee to answer 
interrogatories within ]0 days from the date of service of the 
writ; provided that no garnishee shall be required to answer such 
interrogatories unless and until he is paid or tendered a fee of 
$3.00 for so doing. The interrogatories may in substance 
i nquire: 
(1) whether the garnishee is indebted to the defendant, 
either in property or in money, whether the same is now due 
and if not when it is to become due; (2) whether the 
garnishee has in his possession, in his charge, or under his 
control any credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses 
in action, money or other personal property of the defendant, 
or in which the defendant is interested; and if so, the value 
of the same; (3) whether the garnishee knows of any debts 
owing to the defendant, whether due or not, or of any 
credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action, 
money or other personal property belonging to the defendant 
or in which defendant is interested, whether in the 
possession or under the control of the garnishee or another, 
and if so, the particulars thereof; (4) as to any other 
pertinent information that plaintiff may desire, including 
defendant's job, position or occupation, his rate and method 
of compensation, his pay period and the computation of the 
amount of his accrued disposable earnings attached by the 
writ. 
(iii) A writ of garnishment attaching earnings for personal 
services shall attach that portion of the defendant's accrued and 
unpaid disposable earnings, hereinafter specified. The writ 
shall so advise the garnishee and shall direct the garnishee to 
whithhold from the defendant's accrued disposable earnings the 
amount attached pursuant to the writ and to pay the exempted 
amount to the defendant at the time his earnings are normally 
paid. Earnings for personal services shall be deemed to accrue 
on the last day of the period in which they were earned or to 
which they relate. If the writ is served before or on the date 
the defendant's earnings accrue and before the same have been 
paid to the defendant, the writ shall be deemed to have been 
served at the time the periodic earnings accrue; and if more than 
one writ is served, the writ first served shall have priority. 
(iv) "Earnings" or "earnings from personal services" means 
compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether 
denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, 
and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or 
retirement program. "Disposable earnings" means that part of a 
defendant's earnings remaining after the deduction of all amounts 
required by law to be withheld. 
(v) The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable earnings 
-3-
of an individual becoming due any individual which are subject to 
garnishment is the lesser of: 
(a) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's disposable 
earning for that week; or 
(b) The amount by which defendant's aggregate 
disposable earnings computed for that week exceeds forty 
times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair 
Labor Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings are 
payable; 
(c) In the case of earnings for a pay period other than 
a week, the amount of disposable earnings shall be the amount 
prescribed by the administrator of the Utah Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code under the authority of Section 70B-5-105, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended. 
(vi) Unless a garnishee is specifically informed by affidavit 
of the plaintiff that the defendant has other periodic earnings 
from sources other than from the garnishee and the amount 
thereof, the garnishee shall treat the defendant's earnings 
becoming due from the garnishee as the defendant's entire 
aggregate earnings for the purpose of computing the sum attached 
by the garnishment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 11, 1986, Modern Equipment Company was incorporated. 
(Exhibit 4, Record 131). For several years prior to that time, 
Griffith had done business under the assumed name of Modern 
Equipment Company. The business was incorporated in order to 
infuse needed capital into the business through the majority 
shareholdership of Kyoko Oshiro, an oriental woman (Record 26, 
135) -1 
On the day of incorporation, the Board of Directors adopted a 
resolution designating the Murray Branch of Commercial Security 
Bank ("CSB") as the depository of corporate funds (Exhibit 5, 
Record 132-3). On or about that day, Griffith notified David 
Green, an officer and agent of CSB at the Murray Branch, of 
Modern Equipment's incorporation and of the fact that the funds 
in Modern Equipment's account were and from then on would be 
"corporate" funds (Record 26-7, 135-6, 140). At that time, the 
account contained 3,669.59 (Record 133). 
Twelve days after Modern Equipment was incorporated—on July 
23, 1986—Dresser obtained a default judgment in this action 
against Griffith in the amount of $13,848.81 (Record 8). 
On August 7, 1986, Griffith was served with a Motion and 
Order in Supplemental Proceedings directing him to appear in 
court on August 19, 1986. (Record 9). Because of a conflicting 
it was believed that Joans and government contracts would be 
more accessible to the Company upon its becoming a "minorities 
corporation". Thus, the aim of the incorporation was to help the 
business meet, not defeat, debts owed to its suppliers. (Record 
26, 135) 
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pre-existing dental appointment, Griffith made arrangements 
through his counsel to appear in the office of Dresser's attorney 
at another time rather than appear in court on August 19. 
(Record 27, 136-7). 
Griffith voluntarily appeared at the agreed time and answered 
questions put to him by Mr. Pau] Van Dyke, a partner of Dresser's 
counsel of record. During this meeting, Mr. Van Dyke indicated 
that he would recommend to Dresser the acceptance of $1,000.00 
per month as payment on the unsatisfied judgment. Griffith asked 
for time to make certain he could meet such a commitment. He 
understood that he could have three weeks to get back to Mr. Van 
Dyke with confirmation of his ability to meet the proposed 
arrangement. This meeting took place within a few days after 
August 19, 1986. (Record 28, 137-8). 
On September 2, 1986, Mr. Van Dyke's partner, Stephen B. 
Elggren, caused a Writ of Garnishment to be served on CSB. 
(Record 3 9-20) At that time, the garnished account contained 
$34,391.34. (Record 133, 146). 
The funds in the account at the time of garnishment included 
two large deposits made on August 27 and August 28, 1986 
reflecting funds received from Projects Unlimited and Beneco. 
(Record 133-134). Such deposits represented payment for material 
and labor provided by Modern Equipment Company between mid July 
and mid August, 1986. (Record 134). At the time such material 
and labor were provided, Modern Equipment was a corporation, not 
a sole proprietorship of Griffith. (Record 131, Exhibit 4). The 
amount of the Projects Unlimited and Beneco deposits were 
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$12,462.00 and $28,647.40, respectively. (Record 69-72). 
When Griffith contested the propriety of Dresser's 
garnishment of the CSB account, thie matter was scheduled for an 
evidentiary hearing before Judge Sawaya on the morning of October 
2, 1986, before his other scheduled matters. (Record 125). 
After taking evidence on that morning, Judge Sawaya indicated he 
had no further time and requested counsel to supply him with 
written memoranda on the issues presented. He asked for the 
submission of memoranda by both counsel within ten days of the 
hearing. 
Prior to submission of Griffith's memorandum and before the 
expiration of the ten day time limit, Judge Sawaya issued a 
minute entry (dated October 9) deciding the matter in favor of 
Dresser (Record 46). When Griffith's counsel learned that such a 
ruling had been made without the Court having considered 
counsel's memorandum (which he believed cited dispositive law in 
Griffith's favor), he objected to entry of the Order. (Record 
47-8) 
On October 27, 1986, a hearing was held in which Judge Sawaya 
acknowledged his error in having ruled prematurely. He refused 
to hear oral argument at that time, indicating he would 
reconsider his decision after reading counsels' memoranda. 
(Record 158-161). 
On December 1, 1986—some two months after the brief 
evidentiary hearing concerning ownership of the garnished funds— 
Judge Sawaya signed his final Order denying Griffith's motion to 
set aside the garnishment and garnishee judgment. The express 
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basis of his Order was: 
The facts of the Peterson case and the present 
case are distinguishable in that there is no 
proof that the funds in the present case were 
generated by nor payable to the corporation. 
Based thereon, the Court affirms its previous 
decision. ... (Record 113) 
Following Judge Sawaya's first, premature ruling, CSB 
delivered the garnished funds (some $14,070.85) to Dresser's 
counsel. When this came to light, Judge Sawaya ordered that such 
funds be deposited into court into an interest bearing account 
pending the outcome of this appeal. (Record 115-116). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Under this Court's ruling in Peterson v. Peterson, 571 
P.2d 1360 (Utah 1977), the ownership of funds, not the ownership 
of the account in which they are found, determines 
garnishability. 
2. The funds garnished by Dresser did not belong to 
Griffith, Dresser's judgment debtor, but belonged to Modern 
Equipment Company, a Utah corporation. 
3. CSB should be estopped to assert in its garnishee 
interrogatory answers that the funds belonged to Griffith because 
Griffith had informed CSB at the time of Modern Equipment's 
incorporation (weeks before the judgment against Griffith was 
entered) that the funds in the account were corporate funds. 
(Record 26-7, 135-6) 
4. Dresser should be estopped to proceed on the garnishment 
by reason of Griffith's reasonable reliance on the indication of 
Dresser's counsel that collection efforts would be held in 
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abeyance pending final commitment to a proposed payment 
arrangement and because of other post-judgment improprieties 
committed in aid of the questioned garnishment. 
5. If the Court finds the funds to be Griffith's money, it 
should limit garnishment to that portion of the funds garnishable 
under Rule 64D as earnings from personal services, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OWNERSHIP OF FUNDS, NOT THE OWNERSHIP 
OF THE ACCOUNT IN WHICH THEY ARE FOUND, 
DETERMINES GARN1SHABILITY 
In Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1977) this Court 
was asked to rule on the propriety of a garnishment execution. 
In that case, the plaintiff had garnished a bank account which 
was admittedly held in the sole name of the defendant, 
plaintiff's ex-husband. Although only defendant's name was on 
the bank's signature card and he was, therefore, the only person 
authorized to write checks against the account, there was 
evidence that the funds in the account were derived almost 
exclusively from paychecks of defendant's wife. 
This Court affirmed the district court's setting aside of the 
garnishment execution. In doing so, it noted the existence of 
relevant rulings in several cases concerning joint tenancy bank 
accounts. See, e.g., Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2d 
17, 439 P.2d 468 (1968). In Beehive, this Court held that the 
funds in a joint tenancy bank account are not subject to 
garnishment by a judgment creditor of one of the account holders 
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if the judgment debtor has no equitable interest in the funds* 
This Court also noted that virtually all other jurisdictions are 
in accord with that rule. See 30 AmJur 2d, Executions, §800 and 
11 ALR 3rd 1473. 
The Peterson case, like this case, did not pertain to a joint 
tenancy account. However, this Court found "still there is a 
sufficient analog" Lo make the holdings in the joint tenancy 
cases persuasive. In Poterson, there was evidence that the money 
in the defendant's account "belonged" to his wife. The money was 
used, however, for defendant's child support payments to the 
plaintiff (his former wife), as well as for his and his current 
wife's general living expenses. Even though the defendant 
withdrew money from the account for his personal obligations, 
both he and his wife considered the money to be hers. Based on 
these facts, the district court found and this Court affirmed 
that the money was not subject to garnishment for the defendant's 
debts. 
The facts supporting immunity from garnishment in this case 
are stronger than the facts in Peterson. Here, the account was 
considered to be the account of Modern Equipment Company, a 
corporation. Unlike the Peterson case, there is no evidence that 
Griffith withdrew money from the account for his personal 
obligations. Griffith did not treat the money as his own, but 
treated it as corporation money from which corporation debts were 
to be paid. (Record 27). The fact that the signature card 
covering the account had not been changed to reflect the 
incorporation is not dispositive. The ownership of the funds, 
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not the ownership of the account, determines garnishability. 
Peterson, supra. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IGNORING 
INCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT THE FUNDS 
IN THE GARNISHED ACCOUNT WERE GENERATED 
BY AND PAID TO AN ENTITY OTHER THAN 
DRESSER'S JUDGMENT DEBTOR 
At the time of incorporation, the account contained $3,669.59 
(Record 133). When it was garnished two months later, it 
contained $34,391.34 (Record 133, 146). On August 27, 1986, the 
sum of $28,647.40 was deposited into that account from a payment 
made to the corporation by Beneco. (Record 71-72, 134). The 
following day, a deposit of $12,462.00 was made into the account 
from a payment to the corporation from Projects Unlimited. 
(Record 69-70, 134). Both the Beneco and Projects Unlimited 
checks were for payment of labor and materials provided by 
Modern Equipment between the middle of July and the middle of 
August—after its incorporation. (Record 134). This evidence 
was evidently overlooked, ignored or forgotten by the district 
court when it found as the basis for its denial of Griffith's 
Motion to Set Aside the Garnishment 
that there is no proof that the funds in the 
present case were generated by nor payable to 
the corporation. (Record 113). 
On the contrary, there is no evidence that the garnished funds 
were generated by or payable to anybody except Modern Equipment 
Company, the corporation. 
As the Court stated in Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. 
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Slayton, 407 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1969): 
It is elementary that a corporation is an 
entity separate and distinct from its 
stockholders and that earnings of a 
corporation remain the property of the 
corporation until severed and distributed as 
dividends and that a corporation cannot be 
required to pay obligations which are not its 
own but those of some of its stockholders. 
407 F.2d at 1082. 
This Court's opinion in Peterson v. Peterson, supra, mandates 
the release of plaintiff's garnishment. 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BARS CSB 
FROM ASSERTING IN ITS GARNISHEE INTERROGATORY 
ANSWERS THAT THE FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT BELONGED 
TO GRIFFITH 
Silence or acquiescence when one has knowledge of facts or 
circumstances which he should disclose will establish the basis 
for an equitable estoppel. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 
85, 89 (Utah 1975); Jenkins v. Nicolas, 226 P. 177, 182 (Utah 
1924) . 
When Griffith informed Mr. Green at CSB of the incorporation 
of Modern Equipment Company and that the account at CSB would be 
used for the corporation's business, Mr. Green's acquisition of 
such knowledge became imputable to CSB. Knowledge by an agent or 
officer will charge a bank with knowledge of the special nature 
of deposited funds. White v. Pioneer Bank and Trust Co., 298P. 
933, 935 (Idaho 1931). This imputed knowledge is sufficient to 
satisfy the knowledge requirement of estoppel by silence. May v. 
Ackerman, 51 N.W.2d 87, 93 (Minn. 1952). 
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A bank deals with funds of its depositors as a fiduciary. 
Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Taylor, 384 P.2d 796f 801 (Utah 
1963). With knowledge that the business had been incorporated 
and that the funds in the CSB account belonged to the 
corporation, the bank owed Griffith the duty to at least inform 
him that the ownership of the account was still in his name 
personally and ought to be changed. Having remained silent, CSB 
should be precluded from asserting in its garnishee interrogatory 
answers (Record 23) that the funds were Griffith's and therefore 
subject to involuntary alienation by Griffith's personal 
creditors. 
He who is silent when conscience 
requires him to speak shall be 
debarred from speaking when 
conscience requires him to keep 
silent. 
Clark v. Kirby, 55 P. 372, 374 (Utah 1898) 
No one at the bank told Griffith that the account signature 
card needed to be changed. In the absence of receipt of such 
information, Griffith allowed corporate funds to be deposited into 
the account. Had Griffith realized that CSB would subject the 
account to claims of his creditors, he undoubtedly would not have 
deposited into that account the checks paid to the corporation in 
late August. Great detriment has resulted both to Griffith and to 
Modern Equipment Company as a result of Griffith's reasonable 
reliance on CSB's agent, David Green. (Record 27, 139). 
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POINT IV 
DRESSER SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO RECOVER ON THE 
GARNISHMENT BY REASON OF ITS DEBT COLLECTION 
IMPROPRIETIES 
This Court has stated that estoppel 
is a doctrine of equity to prevent one party from 
deluding or inducing another into a position where 
he will unjustly suffer loss... [T]he test is 
whether there is conduct, by act or is conduct, by 
act or omission, by which one party knowingly leads 
another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take 
some course of action, which will result in his 
detriment or damage if the first party is permitted 
to repudiate or deny his conduct or 
misrepresentation 
J.P. Koch, Inc., v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 
1975) . 
In addition to equitable estoppel, the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel is recognized in this jurisdiction as stated 
at §90(1) of the Restatement Second of Contracts, quoted 
approvingly in Southeastern Equipment Co. v. Mauss, 696 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1985) at 1188: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part 
of the promisee or a third person and which does 
induce such action or forbearance is binding if 
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise. 
A third doctrine often invoked by courts where the exact 
requirements of equitable or promisory estoppel have not been met 
is judicial estoppel. This doctrine admittedly "of rather vague 
outline" has been used by courts frequently in order to prevent a 
litigant from "playing fast and loose with the judicial process". 
1 B Moore, Federal Practice, §405(8) at 239 (2d Ed. 1978). See 
Scarano v. New Jersey Central Railroad, 203 F 2d 510 (3rd Cir. 1953). 
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Griffith submits that one or more of these doctrines should be 
applied against Dresser. 
Griffith appeared before Dresser's counsel and honestly and 
forthrightly answered all questions put to him. He reasonably 
relied on the indication of Mr. Van Dyke that he could have three 
weeks to determine his ability to meet a proposed payment 
schedule. It was his reasonable assumption and belief that no 
adverse action would be taken against him in the interim. 
The failure to forbear appears to have been a result of lack 
of communication between Plaintiff's attorneys. Mr. Van Dyke did 
not appear at the hearing in which the garnishment was contested. 
It may be inferred from his nonappearance that Griffith's 
understanding was accurate, and that his reliance on that 
understanding was reasonable. 
Twelve days after his meeting with Mr. Van Dyke, Van Dyke's 
partner garnished the subject bank account without any prior 
notice to Griffith or his counsel. Had Griffith realized the 
business account would be at risk, he would not have deposited the 
checks paid to the corporation in late August. Great detriment 
has come to Griffith and to Modern Equipment Company as a result 
of Griffith's reliance on Mr. Van Dyke's indication of 
forbearance. (Record 27). 
It is apparent that Mr. Van Dyke and Mr. Elggren did not 
communicate with each other concerning arrangements to collect the 
Griffith judgment. This is blatantly apparent from the fact that 
after Griffith came to Mr. Van Dyke's office by stipulation in 
lieu of appearing in Court on the Supp. Order, Mr. Elggren caused 
an Order to Show Cause to be issued and served upon Griffith 
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commanding him to explain his nonappearance at the scheduled 
hearing, at peril of being held in contempt of Court. (Record 
33-35) . 
Interestingly, the Order to Show Cause was issued the day 
after issuance of the questioned Writ of Garnishment. (Record 
24). The Writ presumably was based on information obtained in Mr. 
Van Dyke's interview with Griffith a few days earlier. 
Griffith testified that he had no contact with any legal 
representative of Dresser except Mr. Van Dyke (Record 139). The 
affidavit in support of garnishment, however, was signed by Mr. 
Ellgren. (Record 15). It avers that "the property sought to be 
garnished does not consist,in whole or in part, of earnings from 
personal service." (Record 15). 
There is uncontroverted testimony that deposits in the CSB 
account included payments for "labor". (Record 134). If Dresser 
is correct in its contention that the money in the account is 
Griffith's, then it is blatantly incorrect in its affidavit for 
garnishment and in its assertion of entitlement to the funds in 
the account. 
Under Rule 64D(e)(v), only 25% of the defendant's disposable 
earnings may be attached. Dresser's counsel employed the wrong 
Garnishment form and improperly sought garnishment of an entire 
fund only part of which, if any, was legally garnishable. (See 
argument V, infra). 
In sum, the record is rife with improprieties committed in 
furtherance of the questioned garnishment. Principles of 
equitable and promissory estopel should bar Dresser from 
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garnishing the CSB account after inducing Griffith's reliance on 
Mr. Van Dyke's indication of forbearance. Judicial estoppel should 
be invoked to discountenance Dresser's inconsistent assertions 
with respect to the nature of the funds in the garnished account 
and to discountenance its otherwise "playing fast and loose with 
the Judicial process." Scarano, supra. 
POINT V 
IF THE COURT FINDS THE GARNISHED 
FUNDS BELONG TO GRIFFITH, 
DRESSER'S ENTITLEMENT THERETO 
IS SUBJECT TO RULE 64D's 
LIMITATION ON GARNISHMENT 
OF EARNINGS FROM PERSONAL SERVICE 
This Court may take judicial notice of the fact that there are 
in common use among lawyers two forms of garnishment writs. One 
form is used for the attachment of earnings from personal 
services. The other is used for the attachment of all other 
funds. The printed garnishee interrogatories appearing on these 
two forms differ. 
The form writ for the garnishment of earnings contains 
interrogatories and calculation instructions based on the 
provisions of Rule 64D(e) iii, iv and v. These provisions limit 
the judgment creditor to the attachment of no more than 25% of the 
defendant's disposable income or, under some circumstances, even 
less than that. 
A condition precedent to the court clerk's issuance of an 
appropriate writ is the judgment creditor's filing of an affidavit 
meeting the requirements of Rule 64D(d)(ii). 
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In this case, the judgment creditor's affidavit was signed by 
an attorney who had had no personal contact with the judgment 
debtor (Record 139) and whose personal knowledge of the averments 
made therein must therefore be viewed with suspicion. 
The affidavit avers that the account to be garnished is 
"non-exempt" and "does not consist, in whole or in part, of 
earnings from personal service". (Record 15). 
At the hearing contesting the garnishment, Dresser offered 
testimony through a CSB "branch administration support specialist" 
that at the time of the garnishment, the signature card for 
the Modern Equipment account (signed January 10, 1975) was a 
"proprietor card" indicating Griffith to be the proprietor of the 
Company. (Record 20, 22). 
Griffith testified that Modern Equipment had only one account 
(Record 140) and that payments for services were deposited into 
that account. (Record 134). If the funds in that account belong 
to Griffith, such funds constitute his "earnings", as the alleged 
proprietor of the business. Attachment of such earnings is 
limited by the provisions of Rule 64D. 
Assuming, as Dresser contends, the funds in the CSB account 
were personal, Dresser may attach no greater portion of such funds 
that allowed under Rule 64D(e)(v), which provides: 
(v) The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable 
earnings of an individual becoming due any 
individual which are subject to garnishment is the 
lesser of: 
(a) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's disposable 
earning for that week; or 
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(b) The amount by which defendant's aggregate 
disposable earnings computed for that week exceeds 
forty times the federal minimum hourly wage 
prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act in effect 
at the time the earnings are payable; 
(c) In the case of earnings for a pay period other than 
a week, the amount of disposable earnings shall be the 
amount prescribed by the administrator of the Utah Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code under the authority of Section 
70B-5-105, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
If the funds in the account are found to belong to Griffith, 
Dresser's affidavit for garnishment must be found to have been 
false. Dresser employed the wrong garnishment form and should be 
limited to whatever portion of the funds may be garnished under 
the above quoted provisions, as reflected in the garnishee 
interrogatories and instructions on the garnishment form Dresser 
should have used, but did not. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should order release of Dresser's garnishment based 
on this Court's opinion in the Peterson case. There is clear and 
convincing evidence in the record that the funds in question were 
corporate funds, not the judgment debtor's. 
Because Griffith had informed CSB representative of Modern 
Equipment's incorporation at the time of such incorporation, CSB 
should be estopped to assert in its garnishee interrogatory 
answers that the funds in the Modern Equipment account belonged to 
Griffith. 
The doctrines of equitable, promissory or judicial estoppel 
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should be invoked to preclude Dresser from garnishing the subject 
funds* Griffith reasonably relied on the indication of one of 
Dresser's attorneys that collection efforts would be held in 
abeyance pending commitment to a proposed payment arrangement. 
Dresser's surprise garnishment and its commission of other 
post-judgment debt collection improprieties should not be 
countenanced. 
If Dresser is entitled to attach any of the funds in the 
account, it should be limited to the funds in the account at the 
time of incoporation—$3,669.59. Because such funds were 
"earnings" from Griffith's services, Dresser should be further 
] imited to attachment of that portion of such funds allowed under 
Rule 64D(e)(v). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 18 day of March, 1987. 
Douglars G. Mortecfsen 
MATHESON, JEPPSON & MORTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DRESSER CRANE & HOIST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN GRIFFITH dba MODERN 
EQUIPMENT CO., 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE GARNISHMENT 
AND GARNISHEE JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 86-4056 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
On October 27, 1986, the Honorable James S. Sawaya agreed to 
review the Memoranda submitted by the parties in connection with 
defendant's Motion to Set Aside Garnishment and Garnishee 
Judgment. Plaintiff appeared through its counsel, Stephen B. 
Elggren of Elggren and Van Dyke and defendant appeared through 
its counsel, Douglas Mortensen. 
The Court, having read and reviewed the Memoranda, made its 
findings that defendant had submitted no proof that the funds 
garnished by plaintiff were generated by nor payable to the 
corporation. In particular, the Court made its finding that: 
The facts of the Peterson case and the present case are 
distinguishable in that there is no proof that the funds 
in the present case were generated by nor payable to the 
corporation. Based thereon, the Court affirms its 
previous decision. Additionally, the Court does not find 
merit in the defendant's estoppel argument. 
Rased thereon the Court made its Minute Entry and decision 
affirming its prior decision not to set aside said Garnishee 
Judgment , and good c a u s e t h e r e f o r e a p p e a r i n g , 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o S e t A s i d e 
s a i d G a r n i s h e e J u d g m e n t i s h e r e b y d e n i e d and t h a t d e f e n d a n t s 
e s t o p o e l a rgument i s without^ m e r i t . 
DATED t h i s / —day of .Mouarobejc, 1986 . 
Approved a s . t o i o n n ; 
Douglas &• Mo^tensen 
ATTEST 
H. D'XCN ,-ei. " • ~y 
k^opUtV C'c^TK 
GGC^.14 
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Things did not go right in this case. 
Allred moved and filed a change of address 
with the post office. On July 26, 1974, the 
Denisons were involved in an automobile 
collision with an uninsured motorist. On 
August 21, 1974, Allred received a number 
of mail packages from the post office, in-
cluding the request for insurance mailed by 
Crown, together with its check dated June 
13, 1974. There is no explanation as to why 
the mail was held by the postal workers for 
such a long period of time. 
Insurance Company refused to issue its 
policy on the wrecked car. Denisons filed 
suit against Crown, Allred, and Insurance 
Company, Crown cross-complained against 
Allred and Insurance Company. 
Allred and Insurance Company answered 
the cross-complaint. They further cross-
complained against each other and each re-
plied thereto. Crown then moved for sum-
mary judgment against the Denisons, which 
motion was denied. Allred and Insurance 
Company filed motions for summary judg-
ment against Crown's third-party com-
plaint. The trial court granted these mo-
tions and dismissed the third-party com-
plaint with prejudice. Crown has appealed 
the ruling of the trial court made on these 
motions for summary judgment. 
The order denying Crown's motion for 
summary judgment against the Denisons is 
not a final order, and since the main case is 
still pending, the granting of the summary 
judgments in favor of the cross-defendants 
could be reviewed on appeal when the case 
is finally disposed of. If Crown wins in the 
main action, the cross-claim would be with-
out merit for Crown only seeks to be reim-
bursed in case the Denisons prevail in the 
main action. If the Denisons win their 
action against Crown, then Crown and the 
cross-defendants can try out their issues 
and will not clutter up the principal issues 
involved in the original action. 
The appeal by Crown from the denial of 
its motion for summary judgment is dis-
missed because it is not from a final order. 
Its appeal from the order granting the mo-
tions of Allred and Insurance Company is 
likewise dismissed without prejudice to re-
new it if, and when, the Denisons recover a 
judgment against Crown. Costs are award-
ed to Denisons, Allred, and Insurance Com-
pany. 
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and WIL-
KINS, JJ.y and F. HENRI HENROID, Jus-
tice Retired, concur. 
HALL, J., having disqualified himself 
does not participate herein. 
fa | KEYNUMBERSYSTEM^ 
Patricia PETERSON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
John S. PETERSON, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 15091. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 10, 1977. 
A divorced wife appealed from an or-
der of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Dean E. Condor, J., setting aside a 
garnishment execution and releasing funds 
deposited in a checking account held in the 
sole name of her former husband in a pro-
ceeding for delinquent child support. The 
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that the 
husband had discharged his burden of show-
ing that the funds in the garnished account 
were those of his second wife. 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, (\ J., dissented and filed opinion. 
Crockett, J., dissented and filed opinion 
in which Ellett, C. J., joined. 
i. Husband and Wife c=>ti8 
Common-law doctrine concerning inca-
pacity of married women to hold property 
PETERSON 
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in their own name and holding that wom-
an's personal property vests in her husband 
absolutely has never been recognized in 
Utah and was abrogated by statute even 
before Utah was admitted into statehood. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-2-1 to 30-2-10, 30-2-5. 
2. Garnishment c=»62 
Funds in joint account are not subject 
to garnishment by judgment creditor of one 
holder of such account if such judgment 
debtor has no equitable interest in funds on 
deposit. 
3. Garnishment o=»194 
Party moving to dismiss or quash gar-
nishment proceedings has burden of proof. 
4. Divorce e=>311 
In garnishment proceedings brought by 
his ex-wife for satisfaction of judgment for 
delinquent child support, husband dis-
charged burden of proving that funds in 
account in his name were those of his 
second wife when he showed that he had 
not worked for over one year, that funds in 
account were almost exclusively derived 
from paychecks of second wife, that checks 
were routinely endorsed to husband by 
second wife and deposited by him, and that, 
although husband deposited some funds in 
account, they amounted to less than amount 
paid from account toward husband's child 
support payments to former wife. 
John L. McCoy of Ryberg & McCoy, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Robert VanSciver, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
setting aside a garnishment execution and 
releasing funds deposited in a checking 
account held in the sole name of defendant 
at First Security Bank in Salt Lake City, 
which had been garnished by plaintiff, for-
mer wife of defendant, in partial satisfae-
. PETERSON Utah 1361 
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tion of a judgment for delinquent child 
support. Affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to 
set aside the garnishment execution, the 
evidence demonstrated that the garnished 
account was held in defendant's name; that 
only his name was on the bank's signature 
card and, therefore, only he was authorized 
to write checks against the account. How-
ever, defendant had not worked for over a 
year, and the funds in the account were 
almost exclusively derived from the pay-
checks of defendant's present wife; and 
these checks were routinely endorsed to the 
defendant by her and deposited by him. 
During the course of the year, defendant 
did deposit some of his funds in the account, 
but they amounted to less than $1,000. The 
money in the account was used for defend-
ant's child support payments to plaintiff, 
totaling $1,200, as well as for the general 
living expenses of defendant and his wife. 
The defendant and his wife each considered 
the money in the account to be the wife's 
money though the defendant withdrew for 
his personal obligations more than he con-
tributed to the account. On the basis of 
these facts, the District Court found that 
none of the money belonged to the defend-
ant and all of the funds remaining in the 
account belonged to defendant's wife, and 
were not subject to garnishment for the 
defendant's debts. 
[1] Plaintiff asserts that the evidence 
shows that the defendant reduced his 
present wife's property to his possession, 
and it is therefore attachable by his credi-
tors. This argument appears to be based on 
that part of the common law doctrine con-
cerning the incapacity of married women to 
hold property in their own name which held 
that a woman's personal property vested in 
her husband absolutely.1 The common law 
concerning the incapacity of a married 
woman to hold property has never been 
recognized in this jurisdiction, and was ab-
rogated by statute even before Utah was 
admitted to statehood.2 A wife's property 
1. See 41 C J S. Husband and Wife, Sec. 24 and 2. See present Sees 30 2 1 through 30 2 10, 
38 C.J.S Garnishment, Sec. 79 Utah Code Ann. 1953. These statutes have 
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is not attachable for her husband's separate 
debts,3 and therefore plaintiff's argument is 
without merit. 
Plaintiff argues that defendant has not 
presented clear and convincing evidence 
sufficient to overcome the presumption that 
the funds belong to the defendant, in whose 
name they are held, and cites Beehive State 
Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2d 17, 439 P.2d 
468 (1968), to support her position. Both 
plaintiff and defendant cite many cases 
which, like Beehive concern joint tenancy 
bank accounts. 
Though this case does not pertain to this 
type of account, still there is a sufficient 
analog between joint tenancy accounts and 
the account in this case to pursue an analy-
sis urged upon us by plaintiff. 
There is no written document in the rec-
ord on appeal between the defendant and 
his bank to review but rather an oral stipu-
lation between the parties that "the 
account is in his (defendant's) name. He 
wrote the checks, and that he (sic) is the 
only name on the signature card." How-
ever the compelling inference from that 
stipulation with nothing else, is that de-
fendant owned or had an interest in the 
subject funds. Of course', the statement of 
facts in this case, ante, shows that this 
stipulation is but one of several facts and is 
lingular in sustaining plaintiff's contention 
of defendant's ownership of the funds. 
[2] We did hold in 3eehi\e that the 
funds in an account are not subject to gar-
nishment by a judgment creditor of one of 
the holders of a joint account if the judg-
ment debtor has no equitable interest in the 
funds on deposit, and noted the many juris-
dictions in accord with this rule.4 
[3] The party mo\ing to dismiss or 
quash garnishment proceedings has the bur-
den of proof. 38 C.J S. Garnishment, Sec. 
272(c). And plaintiff urges, as noted, that 
that proof must be established by defend-
remained substantialh unchanged bince 1898, 
when first passed by the Legislature sitting in 
Utah as a State, and have their inception in 
Terntonal laws See 2 Comp Laws 1888, Sees 
2528 and 2640 
ant as movant to be by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
This Court in Beehive, supra, stated: 
If the contract between the parties os-
tensibly creates a joint tenancy relation-
ship with full right of survivorship, there 
arises a presumption that such is the case 
unless and until some interested party 
shows under equitable rules that the con-
tract should be reformed to show some 
other agreement of the parties or that 
the contract is not enforceable because of 
fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infir-
mity. At p. 22, 439 P.2d at p. 471. 
McCormick on Evidence, 2nd ed.; Sec. 
340 asserts: 
Among the classes of cases to which 
this special standard of persuasion (clear 
and convincing proof) has been applied 
are the following: (1) charges of fraud, 
and undue influence, (2) suits on oral 
contracts to make a will, and suits to 
establish the terms of a lost will, (3) suits 
for the specific performance of an oral 
contract, (4) proceedings to set aside, re-
form or modify written transactions or 
official acts on grounds of fraud, mistake 
or incompleteness, and (5) miscellaneous 
types of claims and defenses, varying 
from state to state, where there is 
thought to be special danger of deception, 
or where the court considers that the 
particular type of claim should be disfa-
vored on policy grounds. 
[4] We agree with plaintiff that persua-
sion by defendant of a clear and convincing 
nature is required in this matter, believing 
that there is a "special danger of deception" 
in cases such as this one but hold that the 
defendant sustained that burden and the 
evidence below was sufficient to support 
the Court's finding, especially in view of the 
fact that both defendant and his present 
wife testified that defendant had not been 
working and earning money for a year be-
3. Sec. 30-2 5, Utah Code Ann 1953 
4. See also 30 Am Jur , Executions, Section 104 
and the cases cited therein, and Rule 64D, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 
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cause of his medical problems and plaintiff 
presented no evidence to rebut that testi-
mony. 
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
This case does not involve any law relat-
ing to joint tenancy. It is a case of gift, 
pure and simple. If it be true that the 
second wife earned a part or all of the 
funds in the bank, it does not matter. Had 
she been a rich woman and given her hus-
band the money, there would exist the same 
identical relationship between her and the 
account as would have existed if she had 
earned it. 
When she turned the money over to her 
husband to go into his sole bank account, 
she completely divested herself thereof. 
He could have bought a car or gambled it 
away and she would have been helpless to 
prevent either activity. There was no trust 
involved, and I think the garnishment was 
legal. 
ELLETT, C. J., also concurs in the dis-
senting opinion of CROCKETT, J. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting): 
Just as real property is presumed to be-
long to the person who holds title, the mon-
ey in a bank account is presumed to belong 
to the person in whose name it stands;1 
and for several reasons, including the fact 
that such a document or record of title 
represents to the world what the ownership 
is, the lawr regards them as having consider-
able sanctity, and they are not to be lightly 
disturbed. 
Of course, it is not to be doubted that in 
exigent circumstances w here by reason of 
fraud, mutual mistake of fact or for some 
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other consideration of that character, equi-
ty and good conscience and the ends of 
justice require, other ownership may be rec-
ognized. However, it is obvious that if such 
ownership can be kept secret in the minds 
of the parties dealing with and seeking to 
protect the property, the door is open to 
duplicity and chicanery. For this reason 
the rule is well established that such refor-
mation can be made only upon clear, con-
vincing and persuasive evidence.2 Specifi-
cally with respect to bank accounts, this 
Court has repeatedly held that the rights 
therein will be presumed to be as stated 
unless it is shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that the parties intended other-
wise.3 No less a standard of proof should 
be required when a bank account in a hus-
band's name alone is claimed to be the sole 
property of the wife. 
The defendant John S. Peterson and his 
present wife have it in their power to en-
gage in deception and collusion to cheat his 
children by his prior marriage of their right 
to support money. Great caution should be 
observed to circumvent any such purpose. 
It also should be said that their testimony 
should be scrutinized with great caution 
because of their own self-interest;4 and it 
should be realized that the plaintiff was at 
a disadvantage to ferret out and refute 
claims that they made as to their private 
arrangements as to this bank account. It is 
not indicated that the trial judge took into 
consideration the matters I have just dis-
cussed; nor did he indicate that the finding 
that the money did not in fact belong to 
defendant John S. Peterson was made on 
clear and convincing evidence. 
For the reason above stated, I do not 
believe that the judgment vacating the gar-
nishment rests upon a sound foundation and 
would reverse it. 
1. First National Bank ot Portland \ Connolh, 3. See Beehive State Bank v. Rosqiust, 21 Utah 
172 Or 434, 138 P 2d 613 (1943), Taliaferro v 
Reirdon, 186 Okl 607 99 P 2d 500, 9 C J S 
Banks and Banking, ^^ 285 and 327 
2. Child v Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P 2d 981 
(1958), Morthcrest. Inc v Walker Bank & 
Trust Co, 122 Utah 268, 248 P 2d 692 (1952), 
Greener v Gieenei, 116 Utah 571, 212 P 2d 194 
(1949) 
2d 17, 439 P2d 468 (1968) and cases cited 
therein 
4. Jensen \ Lof*<in Cit\, 96 Utah 522, 88 P 2d 
459 (1939), Mooie v Prudential Insurance 
Compan\ ot America, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491 P 2d 
227 (1971) 
